AUTOMATED TELLER MACHINE (ATM) NETWORK EVOLUTION IN AMERICAN RETAIL BANKING:  WHAT DRIVES IT? by Kauffman, Robert J. & Theisen, Mary Beth
AUTOMATED TELLER MACHINE (AThl) 
NETWORK EVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN RETAIL BANKING: 
WHAT DRIVES IT? 
Robert J.  Kauffiiian 
Leollard N. Stern School of Busivless 
New 'r'osk Universit,y 
Re\\. %sk, Net.\' York 10003 
Mary Beth Tlieisen 
J,eorr;~rd n'. Stc r~ i  School of B ~ ~ s i n c s s  
New \'orl; University 
New York, NY 10006 
C ' e ~ ~ t e r  for Rcseai.clt 011 Irlfor~i~nt ion Systclns 
lnfoornlation Systen~s I)epar%ment 
1,eojrarcl K. Stelm Sclrool of' Busir~ess 
New York ITuiversity 
Working Paper Series 
STERN IS-91-2 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of  Business 
Working Paper IS-91-02 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-91-02 
AUTOMATED TELLER MACHINE (ATM) NETWORK EVOLUTION 
IN AMERICAN RETAIL BANKING: WHAT DRIVES IT? 
ABSTRACT 
The organization of automated teller machine (ATM) and electronic 
banking services in the United States has undergone significant 
structural changes in the past two or three years that raise 
questions about the long term prospects for the retail banking 
industry, the nature of network competition, ATM service pricing, 
and what role ATMs will play in the development of an interstate 
banking system. In this paper we investigate ways that banks use 
ATM services and membership in ATM networks as strategic marketing 
tools. We also examine how the changes in the size, number, and 
ownership of ATM networks (from banks or groups of banks to 
independent operators) have impacted the structure of ATM 
deployment in the retail banking industry. Finally, we consider 
how movement toward market saturation is changing how the public 
values electronic banking services, and what this means for 
bankers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The organization of automated teller machine (ATM) and 
electronic banking services in the United States has undergone 
significant structural changes in the past two to three years that 
raise questions about the long term prospects for the retail 
banking industry, the nature of network competition, ATM service 
pricing, and what role ATMs will play in the development of an 
interstate banking system. In this paper we investigate ways that 
banks use ATM services and membership in ATM networks as strategic 
marketing tools. We also examine how the changes in the size, 
number, and ownership of ATM networks (from banks or groups of 
banks to independent operators) have impacted the structure of the 
ATM deployment in the retail banking industry. Finally, we 
consider how movement toward market saturation is changing how the 
public values ATM services, and what this means for bankers. 
In analyzing bankst use of ATMs as strategic marketing tools 
we will evaluate bankerst decisions to provide ATM services, to 
join one or more networks, and whether to charge retail customers 
for ATM services. We think that changes in the structure of ATM 
services in the retail banking industry can be best understood by 
evaluating what factors have been most significant cost drivers. 
To make this case, we have organized our thoughts as follows. We 
first discuss the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston on 
network evolution, and compare the current state of the industry to 
some of the Fed's predictions. Then we look at the current 
organization of the industry, how networks are growing, and how 
banks assess the strategic role of ATM services. This prompts us 
to examine some recent changes in bank strategies for using ATMs to 
generate revenues. We will also discuss retail banking customerss 
wwillingness to paytt for services in light of some substantial 
benefits they receive in mature ATM markets. 
2. ATM NETWORK EVOLUTION: A VIEW FROM THE FED 
In a paper published in 1986 Steven D. Felgran and R. Edward 
Ferguson (FELG86) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston examined 
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the evolution of retail electronic fund transfer (EFT) networks. 
specifically relevant to this paper is their review of the 
evolution of ATMs from proprietaryto shared networks. Felgran and 
Ferguson argued that this evolution results from changing cost 
structures and marketing strategies, and projected that the trend 
toward shared networks would continue barring the imposition of 
regulatory constraints. 
According to Felgran and Ferguson, ATM networks progress 
through five phases: proprietary, shared, multiple memberships, 
direct links, and universal sharing. The phases and their key 
characteristics are presented in Table 1. 
................................. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
By 1986 many networks had passed through the proprietary and 
shared stages as the number of networks increased and the marketing 
benefits of a proprietary network were outweighed by the 
convenience offered to customers of networks with multiple 
memberships. With access to a greater number of machines, ATM use 
would increase and the cost per transaction would fall. As the 
systems evolved toward universal sharing, ATM networks would be 
consolidated in order to establish more efficient direct links, 
driving down data processing overhead. Felgran and Ferguson saw 
this happening in 1986 with mergers, regional joint ventures, and 
the establishment of direct links between independent networks. 
They also predicted that the change in the structure of the 
industry would result in competition among institutions based on 
the pricing and nature of ATM services. 
As Felgran and Ferguson projected, consolidation, universal 
sharing, and direct links are all taking place within the banking 
industry, but the competition based on price and nature of service 
has not completely materialized at the retail level. Nevertheless, 
there is some evidence of price competition at the wholesale level, 
and this is increasingly being passed on to retail customers. 
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3. CONTINUING NETWORK EVOLUTION: SOME EVIDENCE 
With the establishment of universal service within most 
regional networks, access to a large number of geographically well 
distributed ATMs has become a basic banking service that customers 
expect. Convenient service is the key to a successful network, and 
banks outside the networks often find it difficult to compete with 
the convenience network members can offer their customers. For 
example, in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area the last owner 
of a proprietary network, First American Bancorp, joined the MOST 
network last year. Because convenience is so important to ATM 
users banks have not had to compete on price to the extent that was 
anticipated. Demand for the service is strong enough that banks 
can charge fees to recover some, or all of the fees they are 
charged for nus-on-othersw interchange transactions. 
Changes in Industry Structure 
As consolidation has progressed, ownership of the networks has 
passed from individual banks to consortia and third party vendors. 
Non-bank operators with expertise in communications and payment 
systems also have joined the fray. Consolidation of ATM networks 
has taken many forms, from outright acquisitions of existing 
networks to consortia formed by banks within regions to expand the 
number of machines available to customers. For example, the Plus 
System was originally conceived by D. Dale Browning, president of 
Colorado National Bank in 1977 as a means of competing with bigger 
banks. It has since grown to be one of the largest networks in the 
country. In 1982 Plus was sold to a consortium of 24 banks 
(SNIT87). 
In late 1987 MasterCard purchased the Cirrus System, Inc., a 
shared ATM network of national scope, from a cooperative of six 
banks, for a reported $38 million. MasterCard made the purchase 
intending to apply technology and principles used in their credit 
card business to electronic banking to decrease costs and response 
time. Visa entered the ATM market earlier than MasterCard by 
purchasing a minority interest in the Plus network, another 
nationwide player. The purchase price was in the neighborhood of 
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$5 million, and Visa took away an option to purchase Plus outright. 
With both major networks affiliated with national credit cards, the 
scope for additional marketing opportunities, including 
point-of-sale (POS) debit systems, was expanded. Non-bank 
organizations that have started networks include ADP, First 
~inancial, and GTE, yet none compares to the scope of the positions 
held by MasterCard and Visa in Cirrus and Plus (MULQ87). 
Spencer Nilson, author of an influential industry newsletter, 
predicts the industry will eventually be dominated by two major 
networks, similar to the domination of the national credit card 
market by Visa and MasterCard. According to Nilson, "since 1983 
half of the top 100 banks and 30 of organizations switching 
transactions on ATMs joined national systems run by Cirrus or Plust' 
(MULQ87) . 
Costs and Economic Considerations of Network Consolidation 
Nilson expects a shakeout in the long run that may leave some 
regional networks intact, as low cost entrants to the national 
networks. But he sees few, if any small networks surviving. Other 
industry experts agree with Nilson that networks are going to have 
to maintain a substantial volume of traffic in order to remain 
viable. 
When Browning started the Plus System with an initial link 
between Colorado National Bank and Central Bank of Denver, he saw 
the opportunity to provide account access to his customers via ATMs 
across the country as an important marketing tool (SNIT87). In 
February 1988 Browning proposed the Plus System join forces with 
Cirrus to allow access to each other's machines. Browning saw the 
need for banks to leverage one another's base of deployed ATMs and 
offer universal access in order to compete against non-bank 
competitors such as Sears and American Express. But at that time, 
his proposal for "dualityw was soundly rejected (KUTL88B). 
The current state of affairs in retail banking competition 
does much to emphasize the importance of cost effectiveness, and 
with inter-connections between the Cirrus and Plus networks just 
getting underway at the national level, the stage is set for the 
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re-evaluation of costly excess capacity. The recent merger of the 
MAC and CashStream networks in Pennsylvania is another good example 
of rational cost-based network down-sizing. Joseph Pendleton 111, 
Senior Vice President of Electronic Banking at Reading, 
Pennsylvania-based Meridian Bancorp commented to us that there have 
not been many changes in ATM placements in the southeastern part of 
the state, but where ATMs have been eliminated, obvious duplication 
of MAC and CashStream machines had been occurring. 1 
Current Nature of Competition 
Dale Browning maintains that competition is now based on cost, 
reliability, response times, and system uptimes instead of the 
number of machines and their location as it was just a few years 
ago. According to Browning, w[s]ystem sharing leads to greater 
convenience for customers, creating more usage in the form of 
transaction volumes, and more favorable costs to us that we can 
pass along to users. l1 Browning1 s comments suggest that substantive 
refinements are being made to previous broad-brush 
"locate-and-processw strategies, and they are clearly in line with 
the push for profitability in increasingly competitive markets. 
Most bankers agree they need to offer ATM services and access 
to a large regional, if not national, network to participate in the 
retail banking market. ATM services have become as basic to 
banking as checking and savings accounts, but many banks have 
charged all along via minimum checking balances, or are instituting 
fees. The key competitive factor in their ability to charge for 
this service is the level of convenience they can offer customers, 
with connections to foreign ATMs as a prime example. Most bankers, 
however, say that at best they are able to cover their costs of 
providing this service, but not generate significant revenue from 
it. According to W. Olen Thomas, Vice President of Branch 
Locations and Facilities with Crestar Bank, access to ATMs is 
l~nterview with Joseph S. Pendleton, 111, Senior Vice 
President, Electronic Banking, Meridian Bancorp, Reading, 
Pennsylvania. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-91-02 
viewed as a basic banking service by most bank customers. Value is 
added with the greater convenience offered by access to a network, 
and customers are willing to pay for this added convenience. 
Crestar has always charged their customers for use of foreign ATMs, 
but the amount charged is only enough to cover Crestarts cost for 
a transaction. 2 
There are other less tangible benefits supplanting the costs 
though; for example, the extent to which ATM deployment protects 
customer accounts and retail deposits, and the extent to which ATMs 
complement branch labor, by extending the effective service 
capabilities of a bank. While they are not usually quantified in 
standard analyses, banks are likely to exhibit the same 
wwillingness to paytt for intangible benefits (in terms of the costs 
they bear) as are their customers (BANK90). 
4. REVENUE OPPORTUNITIES IN CHANGING MARKETS 
Despite claims by network operators and bankers that increased 
transaction volume will enable them to pass along cost savings to 
customers, there is no evidence that savings actually are being 
passed along to retail bank customers. In fact, a 1986 study by 
Sheshunoff and Company, a Texas consulting firm, indicated the 
trend for banks to charge customers for ATM transactions was just 
getting started. Of the 1300 commercial banks surveyed by 
Sheshunoff, 17% charged their customers for transactions on their 
own machines but 40% charged for interchange transactions (KUTL86). 
In recent years bankers have begun to charge customers for 
most bank services (this has been euphemistically called 
tlunbundlinglt), and there has been some speculation that many banks 
were not charging for ATM transactions because usage had not yet 
reached a "critical mass." At the time of the Sheshunoff survey, 
less than 15% of bank customers were considered frequent ATM users. 
But, most bankers ascribed the low usage to poorly targeted 
2~elephone interview with W. Olen Thomas, Vice President of 
Branch Locations and Facilities, Crestar Bank, Richmond, Virginia. 
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marketing rather than pricing. The Sheshunoff survey noted banks 
have been able to charge significantly more for "foreignff bank 
transactions (interchange) than they charge for transactions on 
their own machines. This again suggests customersf *fwillingness to 
payw for convenience. In 1986 interchange transactions increased 
30%, while intrabank transactions grew only 1.3% (KUTL86). Today, 
despite the charges which increasingly are being passed on to 
customers, interchange transactions are still growing (MULQ87). 
Many smaller banks initially decided to not charge customers 
for foreign transactions as a defensive measure. They saw a need 
to allow customers to use other banks* machines for free in order 
to compete with big banks that had a broad geographic presence. 
With the move toward universal access, however, these banks are 
losing as they must pay for their customers' transactions on 
foreign machines and are not receiving offsetting revenues from 
other banks' customersf use of their machines. One banker we 
interviewed said that larger banks had already discouraged their 
customers from using foreign machines prior to the merger of their 
networks by instituting a charge for such transactions. When the 
networks merged his customers increased their use of foreign 
machines, but his bank did not have a large enough number of 
machines to generate significant income from "others-on-usw 
transactions. They are now considering the institution of a charge 
for foreign transactions as a defensive measure. 3 
Some smaller banks have gone so far as to question the need 
for continued investment in ATM hardware on their part. They often 
do not operate enough machines to generate any significant fee 
income from other banks, and because they can now offer their 
customers use of other banks1 machines, the most important 
consideration is to be able to offer their customers a card 
3~elephone interview with Austin Kelly, Executive Vice 
President of Operations, Germantown Savings Bank, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. 
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allowing access to the network.* In the age of proprietary 
networks, the investment in hardware was not an option: banks had 
to invest in the hardware to offer their customers ATM services to 
compete with larger banks. 
Other evidence suggests that cost savings as a result of 
increased transaction volumes have been passed along to network 
members, but not necessarily to bank customers. In mid-1988 the 
New York Cash Exchange (NYCE) , largest among the regional networks, 
cut the transaction-processing fees an average of 20%. This was 
the third time charges had been reduced since the network was 
organized in 1985. NYCE was not the only network taking advantage 
of economies of scale to make themselves more competitive. Star 
System, Inc., the second largest regional network in the country 
(based on number of machines), also cut its prices an average of 
20% in early 1988 and other smaller networks followed suit 
(KUTL88C). 
NYCE did not change the one-time participation fee charged new 
members when they reduced transaction costs. These costs vary with 
the size of the institution and the location. Institutions in the 
New York metropolitan area reportedly were charged from $5,000 to 
$20,000 to join the network, and those in nearby states were 
charged about half those amounts. Institutions in more distant 
states were not charged entry fees at all (KUTL88A). From their 
three-tiered network entry pricing strategy we surmise that NYCE is 
not ready to allow universal access on their machines. Instead, 
NYCEvs members are seeking to increase convenience to their 
customers, but still utilize the ATM location as a competitive 
tool. Since the competition in the region comes mostly from 
Citibankvs aggressively managed proprietary network, NYCE members 
do not have a point of direct comparison for network entry fees; no 
other alternative is readily available. 
4~nterview with ~inda Townsend, Senior Vice President, Century 
National Bank, Washington, D.C. 
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5. CUSTOMER 'WILLINGNESS TO PAY' AND ATM NETWORK EXTERNALITIES 
Obviously, the form of ATM network arrangements has been 
evolving. But, paralleling this evolution is another set of 
changes in the way ATM network services are priced by owners to 
members and retail customers. In fact, we believe that there are 
two additional elements which have been overlooked by many 
analysts, which can supplement the obvious arguments concerning the 
push for passing on costs and improving profitability. Those 
elements are: 
* Network externalities associated with large ATM networks 
have never been higher, and the scope of the capabilities 
offered has never been broader. 
* Increased customer awareness of the extent to which ATM 
network services have matured enables them to articulate the 
value of those services. 
"Network externalitiesw are benefits which accrue to users of 
a network as a network grows (FARR85, KATZ86). They embody the 
idea that the value of ATM network connectivity is not directly 
proportional to the sum of the nodes in the network from the 
perspective of a user. In proprietary networks, network value is 
capped by the efforts customers must put into searching for a 
wcompatiblew machine. And due to the likely limitations on the 
size of the network, users will not be covered in many places they 
visit. For shared network customers, it is more important to know 
where sharing occurs and which shared network dominates in a given 
region (BANK88, KAUF89). Today near universal access to the major 
nationwide shared ATM networks (particularly Cirrus and Plus) has 
created sizable benefits for the business traveler and the 
vacationer, as well as the day-to-day user whose search costs are 
greatly reduced. 
Our basic argument is that bank customers are rational: they 
know how to value the tremendous scope of the connectivity which 
has rapidly become possible. If they are unable, in a word, to say 
what it is worth to have access to a national network, at least 
they can articulate how much they would have to be charged before 
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they would no longer be willing to pay. Clearly, not everyone 
shares equally in those benefits, nor are banks1 customers equally 
interested in making use of such connectivity. Thus, in the 
current market for ATM services in the U. S. , bankers will evidently 
have to exercise much care and probably some patience (so as not to 
alienate some customers) in setting up charging arrangements. 
Figure 1 below suggests the S-shape of the "ATM network value 
externality curve." 
.................................... 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The basic idea is that as networks grow, bank customers (and 
banks, which we will consider momentarily) experience the rapidly 
increasing benefits of connectivity. However, at some point the 
market becomes relatively saturated with ATMs and the network 
externalities that customers enjoy stop growing. When ATMs become 
available just about everywhere. At this point, customers can 
readily evaluate the benefits they receive. In fact, we think they 
eventually reach a point where they will think it is reasonable to 
pay for the service they receive, because they perceive the costs 
and inconvenience of having to do without it. 
Of course, a few caveats go along with this argument. First, 
we haven't calibrated how many nodes are associated with a 
consumer's reckoning of "MAXIMUM VALUEq1. Clearly, this is a matter 
of individual taste, ATM usage and travel patterns, but most 
bankers should be able to make some educated guesses based on their 
knowledge of their bank's customer base. Second, banks themselves 
are also likely to be sensitive to the "externality benefitsN of 
growing networks, but the number of nodes they would associate with 
various levels of value is likely to depend importantly on their 
overall retail banking strategy. With growing participation from 
the credit card companies and the growth of POS debit networks, 
there clearly is a move to make ATM networks the platform from 
which to launch an even broader set of financial services-related 
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products. 
We believe there will be changes in the form of charging 
arrangements associated with changes in externality benefit 
customers perceive. These will extend to both retail customers and 
institutional ATM network members. Table 2 below provides an 
overview of how we think the changes have occurred, and what is 
likely to come as ATM markets move in the direction of universal 
access. 
................................ 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
6. CONCLUSION 
Clearly, the views on network evolution and charging 
arrangements we have presented here will have to stand the test of 
future, not just past, developments. In addition, the shape of the 
"ATM network benefits curvew which we have proposed is really a 
hypothesis, which must be verified by measuring how bank customers 
and banks themselves value connectivity. We are presently in the 
process of identifying potential participants in such a study, and 
would welcome comments from interested readers. 
In conclusion, we believe that the framework suggested by 
Felgran and Ferguson of the Boston Fed still makes a lot of sense 
in 1990. In the long run the networks that survive will be those 
that can build the highest transaction volume and cut their 
processing costs to the bone. The credit card companies obviously 
feel they have a competitive edge in this area, and think credit 
card operations experience is transferrable to other forms of 
electronic banking. Browning has described the ATM as . a 
utilitarian delivery device," but whether bankers will use it to 
differentiate their banks via services offered on the machine, or 
as a means of stretching their markets across state lines, remains 
to be seen. 
All this suggests that the road to further network evolution 
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seems to be heading towards universal access and towards 
capabilities which will redefine the ATM of the 1980s for its role 
in the 1990s. Universal access will create scale economies that 
just were not possible in the past. And the "new generation of 
software-saturated ATMs" detailed by Paul Korzeniowski in a recent 
article in Software Magazine (KORZ89) will create economies of 
scope that should substantially boost the quality of ATM services, 
even if prices charged to customers remain stable or slightly 
increase. We think that consumers will accept the charges as they 
internalize the value of the new high functionality ATM network 
externality benefits. 
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4. Direct Links 




Initially provides a competitive 
advantage to increase or stabilize 
market share. Potential for cost 
savings through reduced teller and 
check processing costs. 
Increased customer convenience with 
access to a greater number of machines. 
Opportunities to reduce unit costs and 
generate fee income from interchange 
revenues. 
Develops in markets with high shared 
ATM coverage, and reduced competitive 
advantages of exclusive memberships. 
Technical efficiencies that enable 
networks to proceed more smoothly to the 
final stage of universal service. 
Consists of the establishment of direct 
interchange arrangements. 
Universal cardholder access to all 
machines. 
SOURCE: F e l g r a n  and Ferguson (FELG86) 







High for owners, to pay for 
substantial hardware and 
software investment. 
INCENTIVE TO INCLUDE 
CHARGING ARRANGEMENTS 
Low, since success likely 
to be dictated by owner's 
customers' acceptance. 




Higher for members which 






OF CHARGES LEVIES 
Still high for owners, but 
more competitive as several 
simultaneous network 
membership choices may be 
be possible. 
If any, per account or per 
or per transaction for 
bank's customers only. 
Fee for network membership, 
and per transaction switch 
fees. Foreign transactions 
charged among members, not 
not passed on until shared 
arrangements stabilize. 
Fee for network membership, 
and per transaction switch 
fees. Foreign transaction 
charges likely to be passed 
on to customers. 
4. Direct 
Links 
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5. Universal 
Service 
High for owners, as they 
realize customers are able 
to "price" benefits (in 
terms of willingness to pay 
for gains in network 
externalities) explicitly. 
Movement towards unbundled 
charging for institutional 
members, and increasingly 
for retail customers. 
Network ownership matures 
as firms articulate charges 
for services and 
standardize charging 
arrangements. 
Institutional members and 
retail customers accept 
"rational" rational charges 
due to clear understanding 
of benefits. 
Figure 1, ATM Network Externalities in Terms of Number of Network 
Nodes 
Value as Perceived 
by Retail Banking 
Customers 
A Externality Value 
Bounded as Market 







x Customers determine the scale 
* as they develop experience 
* utilizing ATM network services, 
* while the shape of the curve 
* remains stable. 
* * 
> 
0 Number of ATMs 
in the Network 
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